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I. BACKGROUND
The fact that twelve states within the last five years have
enacted statutes making confidential communications to clergymen'
privileged is indicative of the need for this privilege. Only six of the
fifty states do not have such statutes.
Sometimes an event within a state brings the legislature to
the realization of the need. The "priest-penitent" statute enacted
in Delaware in 1961 illustrates how legislatures respond to a need
when a courtroom crisis occurs that receives publicity. In that year,
John F. Van Sant, a Delaware police detective, sued his mother-in-law
and father-in-law for $1,000,000 for the alienation of the affections
of his wife. His wife, Sheila, was the daughter of Donald P. and
and Wilhelmina Dupont Ross, the defendants.
Van Sant's lawyer had the Rev. Percy F. Rex, Episcopal Rector,
subpoenaed to testify as to conversations Van Sant had had with him
fifteen months earlier. In the affidavit accompanying the subpoena,
Van Sant stated (1) that he waived the privilege of keeping the
communications secret, and (2) that the confidences were not told
to Rev. Rex in the course of church discipline and consequently were
not privileged. The Rector flatly refused to testify, waiver or no waiver.
At that time, Delaware did not have a priest-penitent statute which
would excuse him from testifying. The trial judge reserved decision
on whether to cite the priest for contempt. Before the matter was
ruled upon, the Delaware legislature enacted a priest-penitent privilege
statute.2 (This case, like so many that involve the priest-penitent
statute, never reached the appellate level.)
* Dean and Professor of Law, College of Law, Willamette University. Member of
the Bars of West Virginia, Indiana, and Oregon.
1 The name "priest-penitent" will be used frequently here as the name of the
privilege, although "clergyman," "ministers," "rabbis," "religious practitioners," and
"Christian Science practitioners" appear in many statutes. "Priest and penitent" is the
traditional name used to describe the privilege; it is short and universally used. "Priest"
or "clergyman" will be used to include all clergymen of all denominations and rabbis
unless otherwise indicated. Ordinarily "confession" will include both sacramental com-
munications and nonsacramental confidential communications to a clergyman. The words
"sacramental confession" are used occasionally in this work because this is the popular
name, although it might be more correct to say "the sacrament of Penance," sacramenti
poenitentiae, Caput III.
2 See The Living Church, July 23, 1961, p. 6, and October 15, 1961. The Rector
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For the courts to function at all in deciding civil and criminal
cases, it is imperative that their fact-finding power include the
authority to gain access to evidence, both documentary and testi-
monial. The general rule is that every human being of sufficient
capacity to understand the obligation of an oath is a competent
witness in all actions and proceedings, civil and criminal.3 He may
be required to testify, unless there is some policy of the law removing
this requirement.
There are two important classes of potential witnesses who are
excluded from the obligation to testify: Those who are incompetent
because of immaturity or mental deficiencies and those not permitted
or required to testify because of a privilege. This privilege may be
that of the potential witness himself or the privilege of another who
can prevent his testifying as to certain matters.
Some state legislatures have declared that there are particular
relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence
and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person cannot be examined in
certain cases. 4 Among privileged communications is the one between
priest and penitent,5 which is considered in this article insofar as the
fifty states have enacted statutes or the appellate courts have ruled
upon it.6
There has been no absolute "priest-penitent" privilege in the
common law in modern times,' but the English judges have, as a
said, "I hope to establish a precedent. If I testify, then one precedent is established.
If I don't testify, then another is established, and people will know there is a clergy
in this state to whom they can go in confidence. An awful lot for the profession hangs
on the decision here. I don't intend to testify, no matter what the judge decides."
3 See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02 (1947); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1201 (1943).
4 Cal., Colo., Mont., Ore., Utah.
5 See footnote 22 infra. Hereafter, the citations of the various state statutes will
not be referred to in footnotes because all the citations of the state statutes are included
in that footnote. The only other statutes that will be cited in other footnotes will be
those not directly pertaining to the privilege and which are not cited in footnote
number 22.
6 The privilege in the federal courts will not be considered in this article.
7 N.Y. Times, April 29, 1959, p. 2, col. 2:
London, Apr. 28--The most Rev. Geoffrey Fisher, Archbishop of Canterbury,
said today that the secrecy of confessions made to priests could not be sanc-
tioned in the canon iaw of the Church of England until Parliament changed
the law of evidence .... The present canon governing secrecy of the confes-
sional dates from 1603 and is regarded as largely obsolete .... A Church of
England spokesman said the seal of confession had not been tested in the courts,
at least in modern times, and that, in any case, an Anglican priest would
probably go to jail rather than disclose a confession. A Roman Catholic spokes-
man said: "The secrecy of the confessional is absolute. It has nothing to do
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matter of judicial discretion, excused the clergy from testifying
about matters revealed to them in their capacity as confessors.'
There still is no priest-penitent privilege statute in England,
although the privilege has long been recognized in statutory enact-
ments on the Continent. In this country, the first recorded case on
the privilege came before the New York Court of General Sessions
in 1813.10 Without benefit of statute, the court upheld the privilege
where a priest of the Roman Catholic Church received stolen goods,
returned them to their rightful owner, and then refused to testify
before a grand jury and later at the trial concerning the identity
of the one who stole the goods on the ground of priestly privilege.
The court said, "A Catholic priest cannot be compelled to dis-
close, before a Court of Justice, what has been confessed to him
in the administration of the sacrament of Penance." Four years
later, in 1817, in a New York court, the same privilege was denied to
a Protestant minister on the ground that his church did not require
or have the "confession."'" Then, in 1828, the first "priest-penitent"
statute was enacted in New York:
No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination
whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made
to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline
enjoined by the rules of practice of such denomination.' 2
This statute, poorly drafted though it was, has served as a model for,
or has greatly influenced the wording of, the statutes in over half of
the forty-four states whose legislatures have enacted statutes recogniz-
ing this privilege.
with the law of the realm. Nothing in the world can change it, not even an
Act of Parliament."
N.Y. Times, April 30, 1959, p. 19, col. 7: "London, Apr. 29-The clergy of the
Church of England reaffirmed today the doctrinal principle that priests are bound to
keep secret any sins disclosed to them in confessions .... The Archbishop ... said
the resolution reaffirmed the principle of secrecy designed 'to give security' to the
penitent."
8 Broad v. Pitt, 3 C. & P. 518 (1828). Best, C. J., said "I, for one, will never
compel a clergyman to disclose communications made to him by a prisoner, but if he
chooses to disclose them I shall receive them in evidence."
9 Typical of the continental statutes is section 151 of the Austrian Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1873, which, as amended, reads: "The following persons must not
be examined as witnesses, lest their testimony be void: (1) Ministers in regard to facts
that were communicated to them either during confession or under the seal of secrecy."
10 The People v. Daniel Phillips & Wife, abstracted from Mr. Sampson's published
Report, by P. McGroarty and reprinted in 1 Western Law Journal 109 (1843).
11 The People of N.Y. v. Christian Smith, 2 City Hall Recorder (Rogers) 77 (Rich-
mond County Ct. 1817).
12 Rev. Stat. of N.Y. (1829), tit. 3, § 72.
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Twelve states have enacted the priest-penitent statutes within
the last five years (1957-1962). In 1962, the legislatures of Massachu-
setts and Virginia enacted statutes for the first time; in 1961, Delaware
and Illinois; in 1960, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Tennessee; in 1957, Maryland.
It is worthy of note that Rule 29 of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence approved by the American Bar Association in 1953, which
is a replica of the American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence 13
of 1942, has not been enacted by one state in the two decades it has
been available as a model. Yet during this time nearly a score of
states have enacted "priest-penitent" legislation. 14
No priest-penitent statute has ever been repealed after its
adoption, 5 which indicates that the legislatures of these states have
not found that there has been abuse of the privilege whether the
statute is narrow or broad, as was .feared by the drafters of the
narrow Uniform Rule 29. The trend, as will appear later, is toward
broadening (1) the class of persons in the field of religious activities
to whom one can communicate in confidence, (2) the class of people
who may communicate under the privilege, and (3) the subject
matter of the confidential communication.
The six states that have no priest-penitent statute (in 1962) are:
Alabama, Connecticut, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and
Texas. In none of these states is there a reported case dealing with
the privilege.'
In developing the various aspects of the privilege, it is preferable
to confine the analysis to the statutes more than to reported cases,
because relatively few cases in the field have reached appellate courts.
In the cases that have reached the appellate courts, those courts had
to deal exclusively with the interpretation of the statutes of their
respective states.
13 Section 219.
14 This is not to be taken as an inferred criticism of state legislatures--rather it
is the other way round. The Kansas Judicial Council has a proposed amendment to
replace the present § 60-429 of the Kansas Statutes with a modification of Rule 29 of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. In (1) of that proposed amendment the wording is
different in import and much broader than Rule 29, while (2) is identical with Rule 29
except that the Kansas proposal uses the word "minister" instead of "priest."
15 New Jersey, in shifting the privilege from a statute to a "Rule," repealed the
statute but at the same time adopted what is designated as "Rule 29." See NJ.L.,
1960, c. 52. The N.J. Rule 29 is broader than the repealed statute in that it gives the
privilege to "practitioner" as well as to "clergyman and any other minister" and adds
"or other confidential communication" after "confession."
10 See, however, Biggers v. State, 358 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) for dicta
concerning the lack of the privilege in Texas. See also 44 Tex. Jur. Witnesses § 103
(1936); McCormick and Ray on Evidence § 492 (2d ed. 1956).
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In thirty of the forty-four states that have the statute, there are no
cases cited under the priest-penitent statutes in the annotated statutes
of those states,17 and there are no reported cases dealing with the
privilege in the states that do not have the statute. Thus, only four-
teen states have reported cases in this area."8 Lack of litigation in-
volving the privilege is not to be taken as lack of need for statutes,
however.
It is difficult to learn how many unreported cases have involved
the privilege. It is these unappealed cases that have alarmed the
clergy of some of the denominations.'
Where there is no privilege, a wilful group on a grand jury
could freely embark on a "fishing expedition" just to find out whether
there might be some information that could be extracted from clergy-
men of some minority sect.2 0 Would grand juries resort to such
practice if they knew it was not prohibited by law? (Doubters are
referred to West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 1943.)
The fact that forty-four of the fifty states have such statutes,
and many of them recently adopted, is a very strong demonstration
17 Alaska, Ariz., Del., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Ill. Idaho, La., Md., Mass., Mont., Nev.,
N.M., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D., Utah, Vt., Va., Wash., W.Va.,
Wis., Wyo.
18 Ark., Cal., Colo., Iowa, Ind., Kan., Ky., Mich., Minn., Mo., Neb., NJ., N.Y.,
Wis.
19 Minutes of the United Lutheran Church in Am., 22nd Biennial Convention,
1960, at 802:
The Seal of Confession. During the last few years concern has been growing in
church circles over the right and power of the courts of law to compel pastors
to disclose confidential information given them in the course of their professional
service. The fact that in two relatively recent cases clergymen were called upon
to give such testimony has highlighted the issue.
A report by A. Robert Theibault of the D.C. Bar titled "Are Your Spiritual Com-
munications Privileged?" made to the Baptist joint Committee on Public Affairs in
1958 tells of a recent case in which a clergyman who refused to testify on the ground
of privilege was cited for contempt and punished by a fine and sentence. The jurisdic-
tion in which this happened and further details are not given.
20 Wharton on Evidence § 596 (2d ed. 1879) presents an argument:
[I]t would not be tolerable to use a religious duty on the part of a large
section of the community as an engine for the extortion of secrets for the
purpose of litigation. To issue subpoenas, for instance, ... and bring into the
office of a committing magistrate all the Roman Catholic Priests in the neigh-
borhood, and then to force them to tell all they have learned in the confessional,
as to any illegal acts, past or present, would be unnecessarily to plunge the
State into a war with an ancient and powerful communion-a war in which
that communion could yield nothing, having only two alternatives equally
deplorable-its triumph over the State or the general imprisonment of its
priests and the suppression ofits worship.
1963)
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of the public attitude toward the necessity for the privilege. Eighty-
nine percent of the population of the country live in the states that
have the privilege.
It is not always easy to determine the rationale behind the
enactment of the priest-penitent statutes. Perhaps some legislators
may have thought that the privilege was closely related to freedom
of religion where the confession is required as a matter of the
discipline of a particular church. Or, it may be that some thought of
it more as the individual communicating with his God through an
emissary. Some may have regarded it as a necessary therapeutic
process whereby the penitent could obtain psychological and physical
relief from fear, tension and anxiety. Or, maybe it was considered
as being in the general realm of the right to privacy. Whatever the
rationale was, the priest-penitent privilege is deeply embedded in
American jurisprudence.
Who and what are affected by the statutes?
1. The individual clergyman is benefited because he knows that
he can proceed with the complete assurance that confidences are
protected by public policy.
2. The confessant is benefited by having a feeling of security
in confiding in a priest without inhibitions when he is in need of
spiritual aid and comfort. This security does not only apply to par-
ticular confessions that have been, or may be, revealed, but also to
the member's general attitude toward the church as a protected
institution.
3. The church, as an institution, is benefited. Public sanction
through legislative enactments to protect the doctrines and practices
of an institution is indicative of the prestige it enjoys in our society.
4. The judiciary of the trial courts benefits from the privilege.
In a jurisdiction where there is no privilege statute, a trial judge is
placed in a very uncomfortable situation when a clergyman is called
to testify about matters revealed in a confession or other communica-
tion which he is under obligation to keep secret. The trial judge has
no common-law authority-by which he can declare the -communication
privileged. Yet, to attempt to make the clergyman testify will only
end in refusal and possible imprisonment for contempt. He also
would be aware of the fact that public opinion in all probability
would be with the clergyman as it was in the Van Sant case in
Delaware. There the legislature, while the judge was mulling over
what to do, enacted a privilege statute showing clearly the public
attitude. When the Delaware legislators realized that the Rev. Rex
would not testify, they decided to legalize the inevitable. They knew
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that no good purpose would be served if he were declared guilty of
contempt and were to "go sit in the clink."'" Most trial judges cannot
"get off the hook" so quickly and adeptly.
There are many aspects of the privilege and many variations in
the statutes of the forty-four states. Therefore, the following questions
need to be answered:
1. What do the statutes provide?
2. What qualifications must a "priest" or "clergyman" have to
receive confidential communications under the statutes? Must he be
ordained? Could a deacon exercise the privilege? Could members
of a church board?
3. In addition to sacramental penance required by the discipline
of the church, does the privilege apply (a) where the church has
only voluntary confession of a formal nature (e.g., the Episcopal
Church), and also (b) where there is in fact no discipline requiring
or permitting a formal confession? Could "discipline" apply to the
obligation of the profession of the clergy? Must the penitent be a
member of the clergyman's church? How informal can the confidential
communication be?
4. In what kind of legal proceedings may the privilege be used?
Criminal? Civil? Legislative committee? Administrative agency?
5. How is the determination made as to whether the privilege
will be granted?
6. Is the privilege an absolute prohibition to testify or may
it be waived? And, if so, by whom? And how?
7. What are the sanctions that may be imposed upon a clergyman
who violates a statute?
8. What problems of public policy are involved and what are
the dangers, pro and con?
9. Are the statutes constitutional?
II. THE STATUTES
Forty-four states have priest-penitent privilege statutes.2 2 Twenty-
two of these statutes have substantially the same wording:
21 The Living Church, July 23, 1961, p. 6.
22 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 58-6-5 (1949); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-2233 and
13-1802 (1956) ; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 28-606 (1947) ; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1881 (1933) ;
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-7 (1953); Del. Code, tit. 10, § 4317 (1961); Fla. Stat.
§ 90.241 (1959); Ga. Code Ann. § 38-419:1 (1960); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 222-20
(1955) ; Idaho Code § 9-203 (1947) ; Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 48.1 (1961) ; Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 2-1714 (1933); Iowa Code § 622.10 (1950); Kan. Gen. Stat. § 60-2805 (1949); Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 606.4 (1955); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:477 (1928); Md. Ann. Code art. 35,
§ 13 (1957); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 233, § 20A (1962); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27A.2156
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A priest or clergyman shall not, without the consent of the
person making the confession, be examined as to any confession
made to him in his professional character, in the course of disci-
pline enjoined by the Church to which he belongs23
One state has the same wording but omits "in the course of
discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs. 2 4 In addition
to the communication made to a priest in a confession, two states
add "or admissions"; 25 other states add "confidential communica-
tion" or just "communication," 26 while four states do not use the
word "confession" at all but use instead "communication," or "confi-
dential information, ' 27 or "information communicated to him in a
confidential manner.;
2 8
An example of a liberal statute is that part of the Minnesota
statute which states:
... nor shall a clergyman or other minister of any religion
be examined as to any communication made to him by any person
seeking religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort or his advice
given thereon in the course of his professional character, without
the consent of such person; .... 29
This statute is broad enough to include within the clergy category all
of Jehovah's Witnesses. By applying the privilege to "any com-
munication," the statute goes far beyond the sacramental confession.
By extending the privilege to a communication "by any person," the
class of confessants thereby includes members of the clergyman's
(1962); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02 (1947); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 491.060 (1949); Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-701-4 (1949); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1201 (1943); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 48.070 (1957); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:81-9 (1947); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-2(c) (1953);
N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 351 (1939); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-53.1 (1959); N.D. Rev. Code
§ 31-01-06 (1960); Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02 (1953); Okla. Stat. Ann. § 12-385 (1960);
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 44.040 (1961); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 331 (1959); R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 9-17-23 (1960); S.C. Code § 56-861 (1959); S.D. Code' § 36.0101 (1960); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 24-109 (1959); Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. § 12-1607;
Va. Code Ann. § 8-289.2 (1962); Wash. Rev. Code § 5:60.060 (1963); W. Va. Code
Ann. § 4992 (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 325.20 (1925); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-139 (1957).
23 Alaska, Ariz., Ark. (omits "without the consent of the person making the con-
fession"), Cal. (includes "religious practitioner"), Colo., Idaho, Ind., Kan., Ky., Mich.
(instead of "examined" uses words "allowed to disclose"), Mo., Mont., N.D., Ohio,
Okla., Ore., N.Y., S.D., Wash., W. Va., Wis., Wyo. Some of these start out "no minister
shall" etc.
24 N. Mex.
25 II., Ind.
26 Md., Neb., N.J., R.I.
27 Ga., Iowa, S.C., Tenn.
28 Fla., Ill., N.C., Va.
29 Massachusetts has substantially the same provision.
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church and members of other churches or members of no church. The
motives that prompt the confessant to confide in the minister are only
that he seek "religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort," not that
he seek remission of sin. Other statutes are even broader. As will be
seen later, one includes communications that involve a "moral trust."
There is a widely approved and recommended draft for a
priest-penitent statute. It was adopted as Rule 219, Model Code of
Evidence of the American Law Institute (1942), and as Rule 29,
Uniform Rules of Evidence, of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (1953) and approved by the American
Bar Association the same year. It provides:
(1) As used in this rule, (a) "priest" mean's a priest, clergy-
man, minister of the gospel or other officer of a church or of a
religious denomination or organization, who in the course of its
discipline or practice is authorized or accustomed to hear, and has a
duty to keep secret, penitential communications made by members
of his church, denomination or organization; (b) "penitent" means
a member of a church or religious denomination or organization
who has made a penitential communication to a priest thereof;
(c) "penitential communication" means a confession of culpable
conduct made secretly and in confidence by a penitent to a priest
in the course of discipline or practice of the church or religious
denomination or organization of which the penitent is a member.
(2) A person, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse
to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing a communica-
tion if he claims the privilege and the judge finds that (a) the com-
munication was a penitential communication and (b) the witness is
the penitent or the priest, and (c) the claimant is the penitent, or
the priest making the claim on behalf of an absent penitent.
In the "Comment" following this Rule, it is said, "Any broader
treatment would open the door to abuse and would clearly not be in
the public interest." Yet the very broad Minnesota statute and the
rather broad statutes of Georgia, Iowa, South Carolina, and Tennessee
have not opened the door to abuse and there is no evidence that
these statutes have not been in the public interest.
There are three recently enacted statutes that deserve special
attention because they have provisions that are new. They are
quoted below without comment but with the new and unique em-
phasized by italics.
Delaware: No priest, clergyman, rabbi, "practitioner of Chris-
tian Science," or other duly licensed, ordained or consecrated min-
ister of any religion shall be examined in any civil or criminal pro-
ceedings in the courts of this State-(I) with respect to any con-
fession, or communication, made to him, in his professional capacity
in the course of discipline enjoined by the church or other religious
1963]
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body to which he belongs, without the consent of the person making
such confession or communication, (2) with respect to any com-
munication made to him, in his professional capacity in the course
of giving religious or spiritual advice, without the consent of the
person seeking such advice, or (3) with respect to any communica-
tion made to him, in his professional capacity, by either spouse,
in connection with any effort to reconcile estranged spouses, with-
out the consent of the spouse making the communication. (Effective
Aug. 11, 1961).
North Carolina: No clergyman, ordained minister, priest or
rabbi of an established church or religious organization shall be
required to testify in any action, suit or proceeding, concerning
any information which may have been confidentially communicated
to him in his professional capacity under such circumstances that
to disclose the information would violate a sacred or moral trust,
when the giving of such testimony is objected to by the communi-
cant: Provided, that the presiding judge in any trial may compel
such disclosure if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper
administration of justice. (Enacted in 1959.)
Pennsylvania: No clergyman, priest, rabbi or minister of the
gospel of any regularly established church or religious organization,
except clergymen or ministers, who are self-ordained or who are
members of religious organizations in which members other than the
leader thereof are deemed clergymen or ministers, who while in
the course of his duties has acquired information from any person
secretly and in confidence shall be compelled, or allowed without
consent of such person, to disclose that information in any legal
proceeding, trial or investigation, before any grand jury, traverse
or petit jury, or any officer thereof, before the general assembly
or any committee thereof, or before any commission, department or
bureau of this commonwealth, or municipal body, officer or com-
mittee thereof. (Enacted Oct. 14, 1959.)
Some of the other statutes have equally unique provisions which
will be dealt with elsewhere.
III. How THE STATUTES DESCRIBE THE ONE WHO I-EARS THE
CONFESSION
Many of the statutes describe the ones who may hear the
privileged communication as "priest or clergyman." 30 Some states
use the words "minister or priest,' 31 while others use only the word
"clergyman. s Where the statute extends the privilege to "minister
of the gospel or priest,"'13 there is apparently no special significance to
30 Alaska, Ariz., Colo., Idaho, Kan., Ky., Mich., Minn., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.Y.,
N.D., Ohio, Ore., R.I., S.D., Utah, Wash., Wyo.
31 Ark., Iowa, Vt.
32 Hawaii, Ind., N.M. Virginia uses the words "regular minister of religion."
33 Ark., Iowa, Md., Mich., Pa.
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be attached to the word "gospel." Eight of the state statutes specifi-
cally mention "rabbis," 34 although they might be included in the term
"priest." The privilege is also extended to "religious practitioners"
in three states .3  Three recently adopted statutes specifically confer
the privilege upon "practitioners of Christian Science,"36 and the
South Dakota statute includes "healing practitioner." One hearing
the confession must be "of an established church" in four states,
37
and "authorized to perform similar functions" of a priest in another.3
What is meant by the words "an established church"? This is not
defined in the statutes and there are no cases clarifying the mean-
ing. Surely the meaning is not a church established by the govern-
ment such as the Church of England. It could mean an incorporated
body but beyond that it would be difficult to conjecture.
Some statutes extend the privilege to "ordained" persons.39
Ordain has been defined: "To invest with ministerial or sacerdotal
functions; introduce into the office of the Christian ministery.) 40
Usually ordination is a specific and well-defined ritual; and in the
Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Episcopal and some other churches,
ordination is one of the sacraments. Most, if not all, of the Protes-
tant churches have a formal ceremony, usually called ordination,
which is required for one to become a minister or clergyman. Ordina-
tion, other than the sacramental or ceremonial ones, probably would
not be recognized. 41
None of the statutes requires that the clergyman be empowered
to pronounce absolution as a qualifying requirement for him to
come within the statute. No statute restricts the designation of the
one who hears the confession to "priest." All add at least one more
designation-always in Protestant or Jewish nomenclature.
Only two privilege statutes mention an age requirement for the
clergyman to be able to use the privilege. The age there stated is
twenty-one.42 There are some denominations that have children as
ministers who preach regularly or at revival meetings. If the laws
34 Fla., Ga., Ill., Mass., N.C., Pa., S.C., Tenn.
35 Cal., Ill., N.J.
36 Del., Fla., Mass.
37 Cal., Md., Pa. North Carolina also adds "or religious organization."
38 N.J.
39 Mass., R.I., S.C.
40 Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1958).
41 See The Watchtower of Jehovah's Witnesses, Oct. 15, 1962: "The only valid
ordination to the Christian ministry comes from God," and not from man.
42 Tenn., Va.
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of a state permit minors to become ministers, apparently confessions
or communications made to them in confidence would be privileged
under many statutes.
Could elders of the Presbyterian Church be permitted to use
the privilege under a statute restricting the privilege to a "minister
of the gospel or priest of any denomination"? The Iowa court held
they could.44 The court took the view that the decision of whether
a certain officer of a church organization is a "minister" within the
law of privileged communications must be determined by the eccle-
siastical doctrines and laws of the particular denomination. In this
case there was a communication by a fourteen-year-old girl to elders
of the Presbyterian Church in regard to certain illicit intercourse had
by her.
Only one statute, that of Pennsylvania, excludes certain persons
who might attempt to claim the privilege. That statute excepts
"clergymen or ministers who are self-ordained or who are members of
religious organizations in which members other than the leader thereof
are deemed clergymen or ministers." This seems to preclude Jehovah's
Witnesses from claiming the privilege even though all Jehovah's
Witnesses are "ministers." 45
The Florida statute is the only one that mentions Episcopal clergy
and it does so by extending the privilege to "rector of the Episcopal
Church." This is a curious provision because in that church not only
are "Rectors" authorized to hear confessions but also Bishops, Vicars,
Curates, Deans, and Canons, as well as their clergy assistants.46 By
mentioning only "rector(s)," are all other Episcopal priests and
bishops excluded from the privilege?
43 "Qualified to be Ministers," Watchtower Bible and Tract Society (1955), p. 256:
"There is not the slightest doubt that children and youths can be ministers of God."
44 Reutkemeir v. Noltje, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290 (1917).
45 Jehovah's Witnesses, Royston Pike, 1954, published by Philosophical Library,
Inc., N.Y.:
Jehovah's Witnesses constitute a society of ministers.... He has been "called"
to the ministery by his fellow believers, and the Witnesses resent very deeply
the fact that the persons whom they have called to the ministerial office are
refused the recognition and denied the privileges that the Anglican parson, the
Catholic priest, and the Methodist or Baptist or Congregationalist minister
enjoy. . . . Ministers are divided into the two classes of Pioneers and Pub-
lishers.
46 The Book of Common Prayer 529, 546.
A Dictionary of the Episcopal Church, 12th ed., defines Rector: "A Priest who is in
charge of a parish." The statute might better have been worded, "Episcopal Priests and
Bishops."
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IV. "THE DISCIPLINE ENJOINED BY THE CHURCH" AND
"THE PENITENT"
Whose "discipline" is the typical statute referring to when it
requires that the confession or confidential communication be "in
the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs"?
This language appears in twenty-nine state statutes.
It is obvious the typical statute is not free from ambiguity in
answering the question: Whose discipline? Does the statute mean the
clergyman shall not be examined as to any confession made to him
in his professional capacity, in the course of discipline enjoined by
the church to which he, the priest or clergyman, belongs? Or, th6
discipline enjoined by the church to which he, the pentitent, belongs?
Could the typical statute with its discipline clause be interpreted
in such a way that it means that the discipline of the church musi
require the communicant to go to confession and without this re-
quirement there is no privilege under the statute?
Says the Arkansas Court:
There is no evidence in this case that there is any discipline
or rule of practice of the church to which appellant and his pastor
belonged which enjoins upon its members the duty to make a
confession of sins. The statute does not apply unless the confession
is made "in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or
practice of such denomination."
48
"A communication to be privileged must be made by a penitent as
an enjoined religious discipline. 4 9
Kentucky, 50 Indiana,"' Kansas52 and Missour 3 give the same
47 Alaska, Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Kan., Ky., Mich., Minn.,
Mont., Neb., Okla., Ore., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Utah, Wash., W. Va.,
Wis., Wyo.
48 Sherman v. State, 170 Ark. 148, 279 S.V. 353 (1926). Appellant was being tried
for rape. Letter was sent to minister asking for prayers.
49 Alford v. Johnson, 103 Ark. 236, 146 S.V. 516 (1912). Contest over will.
Decedent when near death in hospital told Methodist minister whereabouts of old will.
Also had had previous discussions about his adulterous relations with woman claiming
under will and had discussed becoming a Methodist.
50 Johnson v. Comm., 310 Ky. 557, 221 S.W.2d 87 (1949).
G1 Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881). Case dealt with testimony of an elder and
deacon of the Christian Church. He was seeking evidence to sustain church charges
against plaintiff. During this search, he talked to defendant who made an impolite remark
about plaintiff, viz., "She is nothing but a whore!" The action was for slander. The
court held that the remark was not privileged and pointed out that a confession to be
privileged must be "in connection with or in discharge of some supposed duty or
obligation." (The case did not reveal whether defendant's opinion was based upon
experience or hearsay.)
62 In re Estate of Koellen, 162 Kan. 395, 176 P.2d 544 (1947).
53 State v. Morgan, 196 Mo. 177, 95 S.V. 402 (1906). The communication "must
be made by a penitent as an enjoined religious discipline to a priest."
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interpretation to comparable statutes. From the language of the cases
in these states, it would appear that only the Roman and Oriental
Catholic Churches, and possibly one or two more, have a type of
discipline which would result in the privilege. 4 The Roman Catholic
Church, by Canon 906, requires that the communicant attend the
sacrament of Penance only once a year. Would the courts of these
states deny the privilege to the second sacrament within a calendar
year? The Protestant churches have no mandatory requirement for
penitential or counsel-seeking communications within a certain time
period, but it is understood that when the need arises the communi-
cant ought to seek spiritual aid and counsel from his minister.55
Thus, the Protestants are not privileged in those states.
A very different meaning can be given to the "enjoined" clause.
"The word 'discipline' has various meanings. . . The statute has a
direct reference to the church's 'discipline' of and for the clergyman
and as to his duties as enjoined by its rules or practice."5
What is the discipline that binds the clergy to secrecy? Canons
889, 890 and 2369 of the Roman Catholic Church absolutely seal
the lips of the clergy and provide for punishment should any reveal
what particular confessants tell them in the confession.5 The Seal
of Confession was recognized by the Church 747 years ago, by the
4th Lateran Council, 1215. The Anglican Communion, which includes
the Episcopal Church, has most stringent discipline concerning "The
Seal of Confession.1158
Opinion also says that "there is an entire absence of any showing in the record
that defendant even belonged to the same religious denomination that the minister did."
54 Codex luris Canonici. Canon 906.
65 The Episcopal Church has a conditional requirement. The Book of Common
Prayer 88.
56 In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589 (1931).
57 Codex luris Canonici. Can. 889, 890, 2369.
58 Cross, The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church 1234 (London, 1957):
Seal of Confession. The absolute obligation not to reveal anything said by a
penitent using the Sacrament of Penance. The obligation includes not only the
confessor, but interpreter, bystander, eavesdropper, persons finding and reading
lists of sins obviously drawn up for the purpose of the confession, and indeed
everyone except the penitent himself. It covers all sins, venial as well as mortal,
and any other matter the revelation of which would grieve or damage the
penitent, or would lower the repute of the sacrament. The obligation arises from
a tacit contract between penitent and confessor, from its necessity for the main-
tenance of the use of the sacrament by the faithful, and from canon law. The
obligation covers direct and indirect revelation, e.g., unguarded statements
from which matters heard in confession could be deduced or recognized, and
admits of no exception, no matter what urgent reasons of life and death,
Church or state, may be advanced.
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The ministers of most Protestant churches likewise are obligated
to keep confidential the communications revealed to them in their
ministerial capacity. Although many denominations have not spelled
out the precise description or definition of their discipline, their un-
codified discipline or practice is as binding on them as though it
were written. It is believed that a statement in the convention report
of the largest Lutheran Church in the country states the usual
Protestant discipline:
In keeping with the historic discipline and practice of the
Lutheran Church and to be true to a sacred trust inherent in the
nature of the pastoral office, no minister of The Lutheran Church
in America shall divulge any confidential disclosure given to him
in the course of his care of souls or otherwise in his professional
capacity, except with the express permission of the person who
has confided in him or in order to prevent a crime.59
Not only is church policy and doctrine clear, but the statements of
individual clergy are uniform, adamant and audacious-the same
throughout the western world. They will not testify! When called
before the court in 1961 to testify about confidential communications,
a Delaware clergyman said, "I do not intend to testify, no matter what
the judge decides. . . . I will not be coerced. This is a matter of
conscience."60 An English Roman Catholic priest challenged Parliament
in a statement he made in 1959, "The secrecy of the confessional is
absolute. It has nothing to do with the law of the realm. Nothing in
the world can change it, not even an Act of Parliament."'"
In view of all the complexities and attitudes involved, the judge
would be slow to insist that the minister reveal confidences, and
the minister quick in his refusal to testify.
A Minnesota case has a lengthy opinion that deals with these
problems. Some excerpts are:
The "confession" contemplated by the statute ... applies to a
voluntary "confession" as well as to one made under a mandate
of the church. . . . The "discipline enjoined" includes the "prac-
tice" of all clergymen to be trained so as to advance such "disci-
pline," to be alert and efficient in submission to duty, to concern
themselves in the moral training of others, to be as willing to give
The Roman Catholic ruling on the seal (Sacramentale sigillun) is to be
found in Codex ruris Canonic (1918).
59 Minutes of the United Lutheran Church in America, The 22nd Biennial Con-
vention, 1960, at 277.
GO The Living Church, July 23, 1961, p. 6. The adoption of the privilege statute
while the judge was wondering how to rule was a result of this case.
61 See note 7 supra.
02 In re Swenson, supra note 96.
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spiritual aid, advice, or comfort as others are to receive it, and to
be keenly concerned in reformatory methods of correction leading
towards spiritual confidence .... [I]t is sufficient whether such
"discipline" enjoins the clergyman to receive the communication
or whether it enjoins the other party, if a member of the church,
to deliver the communication. Such practice makes the commufiica-
tion privileged, when accompanied by the essential characteristics,
though made by a person not a member of the particular church
or of any church. Man, regardless of his religious affiliation, whose
conscience is shrunken and whose soul is puny enters the clergy-
man's door in despair and gloom; he there finds consolation and
hope. It is said that God through the clergy resuscitates .... When
any person enters that secret chamber, this statute closes the door
upon him and civil authority turns away its ear.... The question
is not the truth or merits of the religious persuasion to which a
party belongs nor whether the particular creed or denomination
exacts, requires, or permits a sacred communication; but the sole
question is . . . whether the party who bona fide seeks spiritual
advice should be allowed it freely.
Rule 29 of The Uniform Rules of Evidence defines "penitential
communication" as a "confession of culpable conduct made secretly
and in confidence by a penitent to a priest in the course of discipline
or practice of the church or religious denomination. . . . This
language, as does the language of most of the statutes, seems to place
the emphasis on the discipline or practice of the church and not
upon the communicant's attitude toward the confession or the
attitude of the particular priest.
The "church discipline" requirement is completely lacking in the
statutes of some states. 3 The Maryland statute, for example,
provides that no clergyman "shall be compelled to testify in relation
to any confession or communication made to him in confidence by one
seeking spiritual advice or consolation." Under the Maryland statute, it
would seem that anyone, whether a member of the clergyman's church
or any church, could go to any clergyman of any church not only to
confess but to seek spiritual advice or consolation and the commu-
nication would be privileged.64
The North Carolina statute extends the privilege to "any informa-
tion which may have been confidentially communicated to him . . .
under such circumstances that to disclose the information would
violate a sacred or moral trust." (However, the same statute also
provides "that the presiding judge in any trial may compel such
disclosure if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper adminis-
tration of justice." No other state has such a provision.)
63 Ga., Hawaii, Md., Nev., N.M., N.C., Pa., Vt.
64 The Virginia statute has similar language but does not apply to criminal cases.
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Is "counseling" included under the privilege? In most of the
Protestant denominations, there is the practice of what is often called
"counseling." In effective counseling with those who seek help, it is
necessary that there be the greatest freedom for the one seeking
counsel to reveal his errors. It is difficult for the one seeking counsel
to discriminate as to what might be harmful or helpful in a future
legal action at which the priest might be called upon to testify. Any-
thing revealed in such counseling would certainly be understood by
both parties to be completely confidential. In many churches, it is
thoroughly understood that the ministers are under the same obliga-
tions to keep communications secret (even though they are engaged
in "counseling"), as are the priests in the Roman Catholic Church
hearing confessions. In fact, there might be an even greater pressure
upon the Protestant clergyman for he would always identify the
person by seeing him as well as hearing him; while the Roman priest
might not identify the confessant because he would not see him in
the confession booth and might not always recognize his voice.65
The counseling with persons who are not penitents, who do not
come for the purpose of confessing sins, and who may not seek
spiritual aid and comfort in the accepted sense, presents quite another
problem. This type of situation arises particularly in counseling about
marital difficulties. A recent New York case brings out this problem.16
A husband and wife were sent a message by a rabbi who had never
met them, requesting them to come to his study. He did this because
another rabbi, who knew the couple well before they moved from his
area, had written stating that he had heard their marriage was about
to break up and asked this rabbi of the synagogue near where they
had moved to try to accomplish a reconciliation. The couple responded
to the rabbi's request and met in his study. In litigation later, the
rabbi claimed the communication privileged and the court ruled
that what was said at the meeting was privileged. One aspect of this
case should not be overlooked, namely, that the communication, if
not privileged, might very well concern conduct not necessarily culpable
nor unlawful-possibly not even sinful, yet would be very important
testimony in a divorce suit.
65 There is another possible distinction in discipline. If in the Roman and Eastern
Orthodox churches, the "seal of the confession" applies only to the sacrament of con-
fession, then it might not apply to remarks made before or after the confession. No
state has a statutory provision covering this, but Puerto Rico has: . . . nor as to
information obtained by him from a person about to make a confession and received
in the course of preparation for such confession."
60 Kruglikov v. Kruglikov, 29 Misc. 2d 17, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1961),
appeal dismissed, 16 App. Div. 735, 226 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1962).
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Many churches, either by written or unwritten church discipline,
require marriage counseling as is required in the Episcopal Church
by Canon 16, section 6(c) which reads: "When marital unity is
imperilled by dissension, it shall be the duty of either or both parties,
before contemplating legal action, to lay the matter before a Minister
of this Church; and it shall be the duty of such Minister to labor that
the parties may be reconciled."
In view of the growing emphasis on marriage counseling in
most churches, it is well to consider this sort of situation in framing
new legislation or amending the old. The Delaware statute (adopted in
1961) is the first one to deal specifically with this increasingly
significant need:
No priest ... shall be examined ... with respect to any com-
munication made to him, in his professional capacity, by either
spouse, in connection with any effort to reconcile estranged spouses,
without the consent of the spouse making the communication.
Should the privilege be extended to admissions made in a church
trial the same as it does to the more usual confession or confidential
communication?"T In a church trial the accused and witnesses are
requested to report at a given time and place to answer charges
or questions framed by others. In the confession, it is different. The
confessant chooses the time (within limits), the church, and voluntarily
chooses the items to be confessed or communicated.
Whether a trial is privileged would depend, in part, upon the
discipline of the church in regard to trials, particularly where there
is the "discipline" phrase in the statute. Possibly the meaning of
the word "confession" in the typical statute might also be important
in determining whether the privilege extends to trials. In the Iowa
case in which the minister and two elders of the Presbyterian Church
called a 14-year-old girl before them after she allegedly became
pregnant as a result of relations with a man over 21,68 it would seem
that the session was a trial and not a confession of the typical
variety. 0 The court, however, made no distinction between a trial
and a voluntary confession. In a trial the accused might not be seeking
spiritual aid and comfort and, in fact, might not be asking even for
W Many, if not most, churches have provisions in their canons, statements of
disciplines, constitutions, or similar works-sometimes rather elaborate-for trials.
Examples: The Presbyterian Constitution and Digest, Presbyterian Church in the U.S.,
pp. 300-333 (1956); Discipline of the Methodist Church (1960) Part VI, Judicial Ad-
ministration, pp. 258-293.
68 Reutkemeir v. Noltje, supra note 44.
69 The Presbyterian Constitution and Digest, p. 44, requires the member "to make
private confessions of his sins to God."
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remission of sins. A penitential spirit might be completely lacking.
Of course, a church trial is different from a civil trial in that the
accused would not have to submit to the former. The church cannot
imprison for contempt or use physical force to make the accused or
witnesses appear.
The fact that witnesses may be called and a record kept of
church trials would seem to indicate that the discipline of the church
by no means requires that church trials be kept secret. This
would seem to eliminate the privilege in church trials if later the
parties are called before a civil court.
Do the disciplines of the churches require that the confession be
oral? There is a very broadly held opinion that a confession to a
priest must be oral. It cannot be in writing and still be privileged
because the mere fact that it is recorded creates the possibility
that it might be looked at in the future and by others than the
priest. Special provisions have to be made for mute confessants
to communicate either by using the hand alphabet or writing
down their transgressions on paper that can be destroyed, by using
a slate that can be easily and effectively erased or by using an ink
that quickly becomes transparent.° Would the discipline of the
churches include a confession or confidential communication made by
telephone? What if both telephones have extensions in other rooms
and one party might be calling through a switchboard where the
operator could easily listen in? This could very well happen to a
person in a hospital, perhaps near death, who wanted to communicate
with his minister but learned that for some reason the minister could
not come to his bedside within a reasonable time. A telephone could
be placed in the room of the confessant for him to communicate- with
the minister.
It is recommended that states with narrow, or narrowly inter-
preted, statutes consider amending their statutes (1) to include under
the privilege all Protestant denominations instead of restricting the
privilege only to the churches of the Catholic tradition, and (2) to
permit non-members, as well as members, to communicate confiden-
tially with any clergyman.
V. IN WHAT KIND OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS MAY THE PRIVILEGE
BE USED?
In most states the statutes apply the priest-penitent privilege in
both criminal and civil cases before trial courts, especially those
70 Sherman v. State, 170 Ark. 148, 279 S.V. 353 (1926). Proper not to apply
privilege to letter sent by accused to minister to obtain prayers, which letter was indirect
confession of charges against accused.
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statutes which do not specify the kind of legal proceedings to which
the privilege applies. The privilege would perhaps also apply to grand
juries and coroner's inquests and similar hearings. The privilege statutes
are almost invariably a part of the code dealing with evidence; there-
fore, the application of the privilege statute would have as broad an
application as the evidence code and no broader,71 unless the statute
gives broader application.
Some statutes enumerate the types of legal proceedings in which
the privilege may be used. The South Carolina statute specifies "legal
or quasi-legal trial, hearing or proceeding before any court, commission
or committee" as the legal proceedings before which the privilege may
be claimed. Delaware provides "civil or criminal proceedings in the
courts of this state" in its statute. North Carolina uses the words
"action, suit or proceeding." The Florida statute states "any litigation,"
while Pennsylvania uses the words "any legal proceeding, trial or
investigation, before any grand jury, traverse or petit jury, or any
officer thereof, before the General Assembly or any committee thereof,
or before any commission, department or bureau of this Common-
wealth, or municipal body, officer, or committee thereof." Illinois ex-
tends the privilege to "any court, or to any administrative board or
agency, or to any public officer." Virginia is the only state that has
a statute limiting the privilege to "any civil action," thereby excluding
its application in criminal cases.
If, by statute, the state evidence code does not apply to adminis-
trative hearings and the privilege statute itself does not specifically
mention administrative hearings, could the privilege, nevertheless, be
claimed before a state administrative agency? Some states have
administrative law codes which exempt administrative agencies from
the general statutes governing the examination of witnesses before
courts. They have the power to summon witnesses and interrogate
them and frequently may punish for contempt if there is an unwilling
witness. It would seem that unless the privilege statutes were broad
enough in their wording to include administrative hearings or there
were other statutes that extended the privilege to these hearings,
then there would be no privilege in cases before administrative
agencies.
It is interesting to note that thirty-nine of the privilege statutes
do not mention types of proceedings to which the privilege applies.
71 West Virginia has a strange limitation. Its privilege statute is under Chapter 0,
justices (of the Peace) and Constables. It appears nowhere else. Apparently the
privilege does not apply in its circuit courts.
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VI. THE DETERMNATION OF ADMISSIBIITY IN CoUrT TRIALS
In a court trial it is generally a function of the judge to determine
whether a priest-penitent communication is privileged. When an
objection is made to the examination of any witness, ordinarily the
trial judge has to determine whether the person will be permitted, or
required, to testify. In a case where the witness called is a clergyman
who claims the privilege not to testify, the judge will have to make
his ruling based on the privilege statute of his state.
This preliminary hearing would involve one or more of the
following inquiries:
1. Is the person a "priest, etc." within the meaning of the statute?
2. Does the discipline of the church (a) prohibit the priest
from revealing the revelations of a confessant? (b) (and possibly in
some states) require church members to confess? In some states
the discipline of the church need not be considered.72
3. Was the communication made under circumstances that priest
or penitent, or both, thought it was confidential? Or, was it a part
of the sacrament of confession in those churches that have sacramental
confession?
4. If the statute requires the confessant to be a member of the
clergyman's church: Is confessant a member of that church?7"
5. (In most states:) Has the confessant not consented to the
examination? 74
In the determination of these questions under most statutes, it is
not necessary, and would be a violation of the privilege statute, for
the judge to inquire as to what was revealed in the confession.
The Florida statute, the only one with such a provision, states
that:
It shall be the duty of the judge of the court wherein such
litigation is pending, when such testimony as herein prohibited
is offered, to determine whether or not that person possesses the
qualifications which prohibit him from testifying to the communica-
tions sought to be proved by him.
Under this statute, if the privilege is claimed, the court need inquire
only as to the status of the clergyman. Apparently, whether the com-
munication was confidential by its nature, and made by a person seeking
spiritual counsel or guidance, are facts to be determined by the priest
himself.
In South Dakota the statute provides: "The objection that the com-
72 Ga. and Vt.
73 See note 70 supra.
74 See note 84 infra.
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munication is privileged must be made by or in behalf of the person
making the communication," and thus by inference the priest cannot
make the objection. The typical statute," which states that "no priest,
without the consent of the person making the confesssion" may
testify, would seem to require the penitent's consent as a preliminary
finding.
The North Carolina statute has a provision not found in any other
state: "[T]he trial judge in any trial may compel such disclosure if
in his opinion the same is necessary to the proper administration of
justice." The discretion of the trial judge apparently would be final
because the only possible ground for review would have to be whether
it "was in his opinion," and even the most ingenious logician could
hardly make "his opinion" reviewable before an appellate court. The
faith that the confessants have in the confidential nature of the con-
fession would be destroyed by compelling disclosure, whether the
disclosure was in the finding of the preliminary question or later
in testimony before the jury. It would surely be insidious to church-
men for the judge to have to go into the contents of the confession in
making the preliminary decision as to whether it "is necessary to a
proper administration of justice," and it is difficult to see how the
judge in South Carolina could make this decision without knowing the
contents of the confession.
Also the question might be asked: How necessary to the admin-
istration of justice? "Slightly necessary" as corroborating evidence?
Just plain "necessary" to explain other evidence? Or "absolutely
necessary" because it is the only available evidence on one or more of
the essential issues? "How necessary?" need never be inquired into
by an appellate court because this is determined only by the trial
judge in forming "his opinion." Without the words "in his opinion,"
his discretion would be reviewable on appeal.
No statute requires that the confessant be one of the litigants
and, therefore, the privilege extends to confessions of persons not
involved in the litigation.
Of course, a minister has no privilege that any other person would
not have, except for the confession or penitential or confidential com-
munication. The disciplines of the churches do not require secrecy
beyond the spiritual confidential communication. Therefore, it is
necessary to inquire as to just what is included within the concept of
the confession or communication. Technically, the seal of the con-
fession in the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches applies
only to the communications made during the formality of the sacra-
75 See note 23 supra.
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ment. Statements made prior to or subsequent to the sacrament of
penance may not be privileged.
No state statute covers this point, but the legislature of Puerto
Rico considered it and in that statute it is provided "nor as to any
information obtained by him from a person about to make a confession
and received in the course of preparation for such confession." In
California it was held that the preliminary examination of a penitent,
in order to determine whether she was in a proper mental condition to
make a confession, was not privileged and that the priest could prop-
erly testify as to her mental condition in a contest in the probate of
a will.70
Does the privilege excuse a clergyman from reporting to some law
enforcement officer the observation of a gunshot wound of a penitent,
as some states require of certain citizens? In 1961, the Ohio legislature
enacted what is titled the "Gunshot Wound Law,177 which exempts
clergymen or priests from this requirement if reporting the wound
would violate a confidential communication.
Voluntary statements to a clergyman, not in his professional
character, of course, would not be privileged; 7 neither are statements
made to a minister acting as linguistic interpreter in a secular trans-
action .70
Mention should be made here of the theory of the confession as
understood by many in the Roman Catholic Church: The priest in
hearing confession is acting as an agent of a higher authority and is
in fact only a transmission agent and, therefore, what is heard in the
sacrament of Penance is heard not by him in his role as a person in the
community, and the courts can only expect him to reveal what he
himself has heard as a person outside the confessional.8 0
However, the Seal of the Confession is not so binding that a Roman
Catholic priest cannot see that restitution is made without revealing
the identity of the confessant, e.g., a watch was given to the priest
during confession to be returned to the rightful owner and the priest
stated on the witness stand that he had received it during the con-
fession but refused to divulge who gave it to him.8 ' Another type
of situation may arise involving the same principle. A letter in the
7G In, re Toomes' Estate, 54 Cal. 509 (1880); Buuck v. Kruckelbert, 212 Ind. App.
262, 95 N.E.2d 304 (1950).
77 Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.44 (1961).
78 Milburn v. Haworth, 47 Colo. 593, 108 Pac. 155 (1910); Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind.
201 (1881).
70 Blossi v. Chicago & N.V. Ry. Co., 144 Iowa 697, 123 N.W. 36 (1909).
80 Greenleaf on Evidence § 247 (14th ed. 1883).
81 Reg. v. Hay, 2 F. & F. 4 (1860).
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New York Times 2 from a writer in Milwaukee stated that a Roman
Catholic priest announced that two men sentenced three years earlier
for the shooting and robbing of a streetcar conductor were innocent.
The guilty man had confessed to the crime in the sacrament of Penance,
but the priest refused to divulge the name of the confessant. 3
VII. WAIVING THE PRIVILEGE
Although by the wording of most of the statutes it would seem
that the privilege is that of the priest, the right to waive it is the
privilege of the penitent. The statutes in many states say that the
priest shall not be examined "without the consent of the person making
the confession." 4 How can this privilege be waived?
Two states, Florida and Tennessee, specify waiver procedure:
... Such prohibition shall not apply to cases where the com-
municating party, or parties, waives the right so conferred by per-
sonal appearance in open court so declaring, or by an affidavit
properly sworn to by such a one, or ones, before some person au-
thorized to administer oaths, and filed with the court wherein liti-
gation is pending.
North Carolina, instead of giving the privilege and requiring
the consent of the one making the confession in order to remove it,
puts it the other way, ". . . when the giving of such testimony is
objected to by the communicant. . . 2,as A recent statute in South
Dakota states: "If a person offer himself as a witness he thereby
waives any privilege he might otherwise claim, which would prevent
the examination of his . . . spiritual advisor, or healing practitioner
on the same subject within the meaning of [the privilege statute] .,,so
It was held in Michigan, which has the typical statute but omits
"without the consent of the person making the confession," that the
penitent waived the privilege by himself testifying as to what took
place at the confession. The court used the words "he cannot com-
plain" which would indicate that there was a doctrine such as estoppel
in mind in making the ruling which had no statutory foundation."s
It would seem that in most jurisdictions where waiver is possible,
it may result from:
82 Jan. 26, 1888.
83 See discussion of this problem in Part IX infra.
84 This consent clause is omitted in the statutes of Ark., Del., Fla., Ga., 111., Ind.,
Md., Mass., Mich., Mo., N.J., N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Pa., Vt., Va., W. Va.
85 N.C.
86 S.D. Code § 36.0102 (Supp. 1960). The Kansas and South Carolina statutes have
provisions with similar import.
87 People v. Lipsezinska, 212 Mich. 484, 180 NWy. 617 (1920).
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1. Statement in open court by person who made confession, or
by his attorney if the confessant is present.
2. Written statement in form of affidavit signed by confessant.
3. Possible stipulation outside of court by the parties involved.
4. Testimony by confessant concerning what transpired at con-
fession which would be construed as either waiver or estoppel.
What about the privilege concerning the confession of one who
has died? None but a devout spiritualist would contend that the con-
fessant could give consent. But suppose the minister were to take
it upon himself to decide that, if the man were alive, he would give
consent for the minister to testify. Or, suppose the decedent had left
a properly executed will or document in which he stated he wanted
the priest to tell all. Under the North Carolina statute, which permits
testimony unless it is objected to by the communicant, the priest
would lose his privilege concerning the confession of one now dead.
Some of the state statutes that do not have the "consent" clause
apparently prohibit testimony by a clergyman concerning statements
made in the confession. The language used is "no minister shall [be
allowed to] disclose,""8 "shall not be competent witnesses,18 9 "shall
be incompetent to testify,"90 "shall not testify,"91 "shall not be allowed
[or compelled] to disclose," '92 or "shall not be permitted to testify."9 3
VIII. WHAT APE THE SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATION
OF THE CONFIDENCE?
If a priest or clergyman does not wish to exercise the privilege
and does testify against the wishes, or without the consent, of the
confessant, what are the resulting sanctions that may be imposed upon
him?
The sanctions could be either criminal or civil. It would seem
if one chose not to exercise a privilege bestowed upon him by a statute,
unless the statute absolutely prohibits him from testifying concerning
confessions, he should not be punished. But in some circumstances
the privilege would be of little value to the counsel-seeker unless there
were some sanction to seal the lips of a wilful clergyman.
Tennessee is the only state that provides by statute for criminal
punishment for violation of the statute: "Any minister . ..violating
§ 24-109, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not less than
88 Ga., Mich. But see People v. Lipsezinska, supra note 87.
89 Ind.
90 Mo. and W. Va.
91 Ohio and Wyo.
92 Ark., Md., N.J., N.Y.
03 Vt.
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fifty dollars ($50.00) and imprisoned in the county jail or workhouse
not exceeding six (6) months."94 If the statute does not have such a
punitive provision, it is doubtful whether criminal punishment could
be imposed upon a clergyman who testifies concerning a confession
even though the wording of the statute invoked absolute prohibition.
Of course, such a violation of the statute would usually enable the
person injured by the testimony to get a reversal on appeal, but that
would be after "the cat was out of the bag."
Would the injured person have a civil action against a clergyman
who violated the statute? There are no appealed cases on this point.
If a legal right-duty relationship has been violated, it would have to
be either a contract or tort.
A widely accepted Dictionary of the Christian Church95 states
concerning the "Seal of the Confession":
The obligation arises from a tacit contract between the peni-
tent and confessor, from its necessity for the maintenance of the
use of the sacrament by the faithful, and from canon law.
Despite this description, "a tacit contract," it is doubtful whether
recovery could be had on the basis of contract law.
Could there be a recovery in tort? It seems doubtful because no
theory of legal liability would fit such a case. Whatever moral rights
and obligations may be involved in a violation of the "seal of the
confession," there seems to be no tort basis for recovery.
Could one get an injunction in equity to enjoin a clergyman from
testifying where the statute forbad him to testify without the consent
of the one making the confession? If the confessant is a litigant, of
course, objection could be made when the clergyman would be offered
as a witness. But the confessant might not be a litigant. He might
be in a distant town or in another state. Suppose he heard that there
was a probability the clergyman would testify as to confidential com-
munications he had made to him. Perhaps an injunction might be
issued. Then, if he testified concerning those communications it would
be contempt of court, but it would be highly improbable that a civil
action could be brought by the confessant against the minister for
damages resulting from such contempt.
IX. SOME PROBLEMS OF POLICY
1. Is it necessary to have a broad priest-penitent privilege?
About this there should be little doubt. It is needed by the
clergyman, by those individuals who require spiritual counsel or a
94 Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-110 (1959).
95 See note 58 supra.
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process by which they can be relieved from a feeling of spiritual
guilt, by the church as an institution, by the trial judge and by society.
The reason for having the privilege appears to be very deep-seated.
Among the things that are considered reprehensible and detestable
by all men is the violation of a confidence by anyone. Among the most
hardened criminals, as well as among the saintly and most law-abiding
citizens, the feeling of revulsion is the same. A person should know
he cannot confide in the town gossip, but if he cannot freely confide
in a priest when seeking remission of sin or seeking spiritual aid and
comfort, this would strike at the concept of confidence in a most
critical area. Of all people, the minister is supposed to represent
the highest in ethics and morals. His business deals with right and
wrong, the ethical and unethical.
Most clergy will not testify concerning confidential communi-
cations regardless of whether there is a statutory privilege. They are
bound by an overpowering discipline that dictates the strictest stand-
ards of conduct concerning the maintenance of the inviolability of the
confidential communication made to them in their ministerial capacity.
This is just as true of most Protestant clergy as it is of the Roman Cath-
olic. Therefore, in a state without the privilege, a clergyman facing
contempt charges for refusing to testify would have little trouble
making the decision about what to do. He would refuse, face contempt
charges, and imprisonment. The pressure from an institutional stand-
point would reinforce his determination. To testify would cast doubt
upon the security all people have toward the secrecy of confidential
communications to the clergy.
People take for granted they have the complete right to talk to
their ministers penitentially in confidence. "Whether it is the law or
not, people have the right to go to an ordained clergyman and tell
their troubles without fear. This is the refuge of people in trouble,
acknowledged by all men of goodwill." '96
The Iowa court has recognized "that the human being does
sometimes have need of a place of penitence and confession and spirit-
ual discipline. .... ,,97
If the privilege were taken away and the confidential nature of
the penitential communications violated and disregarded, the work of
the church would be greatly hampered and a purely secular society
would be well on its way.
Since the confidential communications may give relief from
06 Statement of clergyman who had refused to testify and was awaiting judge's
decision on contempt and imprisonment. The Living Church, July 23, 1961, p. 6.
97 Reutkemeir v. Noltje, supra note 44.
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tensions and anxieties, is not the psychological therapeutic value
to the individual, and thus to the body politic, significant enough that
we should protect the relationship that accomplishes this result? The
need for improving mental health has been recognized and emphasized.
Newspaper columns and magazine articles constantly deal with this
increasingly important problem. The field of psychiatry has grown.
The confession, or confidential communication, is too important to
the people to permit the security of the penitent to be shattered, par-
ticularly when he may not be well equipped to distinguish between
sin and crime, for what may or may not later be of probative value
in a possible future law suitY8
Today, the need for the statute, and a broad one, is made more
manifest as a result of the development within this century of a
greater psychological understanding and analysis of the working of
the human mind. This progressive awareness is reflected in the more
recent statutes. As an example, the Massachusetts statute enacted in
1962 in part states:
... nor shall a priest, rabbi or ordained or licensed minister
of any church or an accredited Christian Science practitioner testify
as to any communication made to him by any person in seeking
religious or spiritual advice or comfort, or as to his advice given
thereon in the course of his professional duties or in his profes-
sional character, without the consent of such person. (Emphasis
added.)
Statements in confessions could be inaccurate, and could be in-
tended to mislead, if an unscrupulous confessant thought the state-
ments could be used later in a trial. Due to the belief in the usual
truthfulness of facts told during the confession, the testimony of a
clergyman concerning the confession might be given too much weight
in reaching a finding. Suppose that in a state where there is no
privilege, two men, Mr. Badd and Mr. Worse, plan to hold up a
small store in a residential neighborhood. Badd pleads with Worse
not to take a pistol along, but to no avail. In the hold-up, Worse shoots
the old storekeeper. Thereafter, Worse goes to confession and, instead
of submitting to the priest his murder of the old man, confesses that
98 On the other hand, it is doubtful whether the needs of the individual would be
carried so far as to extend it to the well-known Negro group which call themselves
"Muslims," even though they might refer to their organization as a church. Very few
people would want a statute that would extend the privilege to some of the pietistic
groups who have revived the pattern of early church life, in which the gathered com-
munity of believers is itself the receiver of confession and the proclaimer of forgiveness
and absolution. (The group called Moral Rearmament has made group confession a
structural part of its life.)
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he drove the car to the holdup scene and, although he pleaded with
Badd not to kill the man, Badd nevertheless did it, and then Worse
drove him away from the scene. This confession and admission of
guilt to being an accessory before and after the fact, made as a means
of shifting the blame for the actual murder from himself to Badd,
might be rather potent evidence.
2. Should the privilege apply only to confessions of members of
the clergyman's church?
A woman, a member of the Baptist Church, was greatly dis-
traught-contemplating suicide. She felt an impelling need to confess.
In the belief that all Episcopalian priests hear confessions and that
they are sworn to secrecy, she telephoned a priest of that church after
midnight and they met at the church. The "penitent," who was under-
going a severe emotional crisis and had a "scrupulous" conscience,
confessed and was advised by the priest. She was greatly relieved and
after a time returned to some semblance of a more normal outlook.
"There is great mobility of church members in going from one denomi-
nation to another."99
Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, this "confession" would
not be privileged because Rule 29 (b) provides: "'penitent' means a
member of a church or religious denomination or organization who has
made a penitential communication to a priest thereof. . . ." (Emphasis
added.) Is the fact that the "penitent" is a member of another church
really important? If a possible objective is to give security to one
seeking spiritual help and who is undergoing a severe emotional
crisis, would it not be more realistic to protect the penitent by looking
to the mental condition, attitudes and beliefs of the confessant at the
time of the confession to determine privilege, than to inquire whether
he had gone through the ritual of confirmation in the Episcopal
Church? "The clergyman's door should always be open; he should
hear all who come regardless of church affiliation.' 00
Of course, an objective test, such as records of baptism and con-
firmation of the penitent and the written discipline of the church, as
a basis for determining whether the privilege applies in case of chal-
lenge, is the clear-cut, easy way. To go into the subjective psycho-
logical processes of the penitent at the time of the' confession throws
a difficult, time-consuming burden upon the court. Courts will always
have difficult problems of admissibility, but that is at times inevitable.
3. Is it realistic to expect the penitent to learn what the law
is in any given jurisdiction before going to confession?
99 Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, stated clerk of the United Presbyterian Church in
the U.SA., TV program, Lamp Unto My Feet, Sunday, Oct. 28, 1962.
100 In re Swenson, supra note 56.
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Some may say that the burden should be on the penitent to find
out whether the planned confession is within the privilege-that ig-
norance is no excuse. In a time when there are great shifts of popu-
lation from one jurisdiction to another (40,000,000 Americans move
each year), it is highly unlikely that a confessant would realize that
the law pertaining to the privilege of priest and penitent differs from
state to state. The law of priest-penitent privilege is not generally
known or understood as is the law pertaining to murder, arson,
or the other crimes. Murder is murder in any state. Few would
suspect that confessions are not privileged in some jurisdictions.
No doubt, most confessants in El Paso, Texas; Oxford, Mississippi;
Portland, Maine; Birmingham, Alabama; New Haven, Connecticut;
or Farmington, New Hampshire, are not aware of the lack of
statutory sanction for the confidential nature of the confession.
Perhaps it is well to remember that the confession that needs the
privilege most is the confession made while the confessant is in a
state of severe emotional crisis. This is not a time when one calmly
goes to a law library to look up the law or to conduct a careful inves-
tigation into the doctrines of the church or the authority of the one
hearing the confession. If the penitent knows a lawyer, which he may
not, it is unlikely that it would occur to him at that time to consult
the lawyer about the law of priest and penitent privilege in that state
before going to confession.
Human nature being what it is, can anyone, however enthralled
by empty logic he may be, or fearful of dire results that do not happen,
really expect the sorely troubled confessant to find out beforehand
what the law is concerning privilege in that jurisdiction before going
to confession?
There is great need for a modern priest-penitent statute that
would be acceptable to state legislatures. Rule 29 of the Uniform
Rules has been demonstrated to be totally unacceptable.
4. Should the privilege be confined to sacramental confessions
and denied to "confidential communications" or "counseling"?
People are people, and people have the same feelings of guilt,
sin, or a "scrupulous conscience," whether they are Roman Catholic,
Eastern Orthodox, Episcopalian, or members of a denomination that
from a doctrinal standpoint has no sacrament of Penance but does
practice ministerial counseling. "Much pastoral counseling involves
processes that could properly be called confession, leading toward
processes that could be called forgiveness, reconciliation or abso-
lution."''1
301 Guilt and Forgiveness, a paper by Robert E. Elliott, Perkins School of Theology,
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5. Should the penitent be allowed to waive the privilege?
The churches of the Catholic tradition have no provision for
breaking "the Seal of the Confession." Should they be required to do
so, if the penitent insists that they do? Any violation of this strict
rule would undoubtedly break down the respect in which the con-
fession is held. The danger might not be so great were it not for the
fact that the waiver is granted by the penitent at a time when he is
not looking at the matter in its long-term perspective.
The waiver privilege could also be the instrument of abuse by a
scheming, wilful, and debased person. He could confess a number of
different versions to a number of different priests and then waive the
privilege for the one who best suited his purpose but not waive it for
the priests who would not serve his purpose.
There is another possible danger in permitting the penitent to
waive the privilege. Psychiatrists are well aware of a certain type of
mental illness that creates a compulsion in some people to admit and
suffer for crimes they did not commit. As a matter of fact, these
people sometimes are much more convincing than the real criminal.
If such mentally ill people could call upon the clergy freely to corrob-
orate such admissions, it would result in unnecessary and undesirable
complications.
6. Is it safe to delegate to the clergy the power to determine
what communication is privileged and what is not (as the Florida
statute does)?
Someone has to decide whether a communication (or part of it)
is privileged when the minister is called as a witness and claims the
privilege. There are only three people who could possibly be con-
sidered for this decision: the minister, the penitent and the judge.
Many ministers would be well-qualified by training and experience
to make this decision. They would be able to look upon it with a
higher degree of objectivity than penitents, for penitents would be
biased.
Possibly (though improbably) a case might arise in which the
clergyman would state that he thought the counseling was not con-
fidential, but the counsel-seeker would state that he understood it
was. This situation could arise more often in the Protestant churches
where the communication is rather informal. If the counsel-seeker
communicated in the bona fide belief that the communication was
privileged, it would be reasonable to give great weight to his belief.
Perhaps here the only reasonable solution would be for the judge to
presented to conference of supervisors, Council for Clinical Training, held at Washington,
D.C., October 24-25, 1960.
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make the determination of privilege after questioning both the priest
and the confessant in chambers about their beliefs and other factors
leading up to the confession without getting into the contents of the
confession.
7. Should unordained "marriage counselors" or "psychologists"
be given the privilege concerning communications made to them while
employed as special assistants to clergymen?
Of course, the minister himself would have to have the privilege
to refuse to testify about marriage counseling revelations before any
consideration can be given to extending it to assistants. When the
parties engage in marriage counseling, must it be in the nature
of a repentant sinner seeking to confess his sins, do penance and obtain
absolution, in order for it to be privileged? In some states, yes. Some
marriage counseling would be privileged in states where the statutes
in substance give the privilege to "communications" and do not confine
it to the sacramental confession, but permit the privilege to one seeking
"spiritual aid, or comfort." The privilege is specifically granted to
clergymen for marriage counseling in the Delaware statute.
Looking at this problem from another angle: What professions
may deal with marital problems and which of these are already
privileged? The psychiatrist may deal with them. The lawyer, when
a client comes to talk over a divorce, may be deeply involved in
counseling. Professional marriage counselors who are usually trained
psychologists also counsel. Of these (excluding for the moment the
minister), the psychiatrist and lawyer would enjoy the privilege of
confidential communication. In many states, if not most, the psy-
chologist might not, unless he is also a physician.
Today, under the impact of modern specialization, we fre-
quently find that several people, instead of just one, assist in
rendering a particular service in any given field. The doctor may find
it necessary to have a nurse present when giving a patient certain
tests. Therefore, some states have included nurses within the privilege
of the doctor. Likewise, lawyers' stenographers are included in some
states. These assistants are really agents of the privileged professional
man and are employed to do certain specialized things for him.
Would not the same need and the same logic apply to unordained
specialists on the staff of a priest?
In view of the present trend for specialization, the privilege given
to other professions in marriage counseling, the whole temper of our
present learning and understanding, it would seem reasonable to
extend the privilege to those agents of the clergy who are specialists
in marriage counseling.
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However, if the clergyman refers the counsel-seeker to an inde-
pendent counselor not employed as an assistant to the clergyman, then,
of course, the privilege could not apply, although there might be
another statute making communications to such counselors privileged.
X. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIEST-PENITENT STATUTES
It is not the purpose of this article to analyze the constitutionality
of the priest-penitent statutes. But, it would be inappropriate not to
raise two questions pertaining to the validity of the statutes in view
of present trends.1 2
1. Is there invidious discrimination in a state's classification
which grants greater protection to persons in some churches than to
persons in other churches?
There are several states that give the privilege only to those clergy
whose churches require its members to attend the sacrament of
penance and seal the lips of its clergy. In these states the privi-
lege is not based upon status such as is the privilege of the
lawyer, the doctor, and the spouse. The law does not provide
that the disciplines of a certain group of doctors will be the
determining factor in granting the privilege while those not within
this discipline will not have the privilege. Nor is there any school of
thought or practice within the legal profession that alone can enjoy
the privilege while it is denied to other lawyers.
The privilege statutes of the other professions depend entirely
upon status. It is not required that the client believe in any particular
theory of disease or jurisprudence. The nature of the relationship and
service is the only determining factor in the doctor-patient and
lawyer-client privileges.
Is a classification that gives the privilege to a clergy of one or
two churches but denies it to the clergy of scores of other churches
a reasonable classification? The discipline as to confidentiality is
nearly the same. The need of the individual is the same.
It is beyond question that the United States Supreme Court has
demonstrated a trend to broaden the protection afforded under the
equal protection clause. It is because of this trend that this question
of the constitutionality of the priest-penitent statutes in those states
that discriminate is raised.
2. Is the "establishment of religion" doctrine violated by priest-
penitent statutes?
102 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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There are two aspects to this problem:
(a) Is state legislation that favors some churches over others a
violation of the doctrine? The statutes of some states, as interpreted
by their courts, extend the privilege to clergymen and members of
some churches while denying the same privilege to clergymen and
members of other churches. The privilege is given by these states only
when the particular church (1) requires the confessant to come to
confession regularly, and (2) the church discipline seals the lips of
its clergy by stated prohibitions. The privilege is denied to those
denominations which do not have these canonical enjoinders. Does
this tend to the establishment of religion by giving these protections
to some churches and denying them to others?
(b) Regardless of whether there is or is not a denominational
discrimination, do all priest-penitent statutes violate the "establishment
of religion" doctrine? Might it be urged that the obligation to answer
a subpoena and testify in court is an obligation of all citizens and
to excuse clergymen from this obligation on the ground of religion
is in effect making the state and religion partners in this scheme? Is
the state thereby breaking down the wall of separation between church
and state?
XI. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended:
1. That some national organization of attorneys sponsor the
drafting of a statute covering privileged confidential communications
to clergymen that would be modern and acceptable to state legis-
latures.10
3
2. That the drafting committee be composed of 15 men to be
chosen as follows:
a. Seven experienced legislative draftsmen: The man most
responsible for the drafting of the priest-penitent statutes in each
of the following states: Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts,
South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.
b. Four clergymen from major churches.
c. A trial judge.
d. Two legal educators.
e. A teacher from a theological school.
103 Rule 29 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence has been unacceptable. The need
for uniformity throughout the country in this day of widespread population migration
from region to region is obvious.
